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AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
A PSYCHOLEGAL INVESTIGATION OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION OF PORTRAITS OF
AMERICAN INDIANS
J Win. Moreland, Esq. *
For years there has been a feeling that the law must afford
some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of
private persons.**
Introduction
The difficulties besetting American Indians who face the
American judiciary are by now proverbial. Adding to these
hardships are three disturbing cases-Bitsie v. Walston,, Nelson
v. Times,2 and Benally v. Hundred Arrows Press3-which hold
that, as a matter of law, American Indians lack the ordinary
sensibilities of reasonable people.
These cases all involve invasions of privacy accomplished by
the unauthorized publication of the portraits of American In-
dians who were photographed at their reservation homes. The
Indian plaintiffs brought suit in each of these cases, maintaining
that their privacy had been violated, and, that they were partic-
ularly injured because their traditional cultural beliefs warned
them against the evils to which one's portrait can be put if it
is published without the subjects' knowledge. Because the courts
involved have held that Indians, and American Indian traditional
* A.A.S., 1975, Illinois Central College; B.A., 1978, M.A., 1980, Bradley Uni-
versity; J.D., 1990, Ph.D., 1991 (expected), University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Legal
Counsel, Legislative Research Division, Legislative Council of the Nebraska Unicameral
Legislature.
Third place award, 1987-88 American Indian Law Review writing Competition. Due
to delays in publication and the author's graduation from law school, the Review is
publishing this paper as a lead article. Because of the inability of the Review staff to
obtain certain materials cited in this article, we have relied on the author's own research
and expertise to verify those materials.-Ed.
** Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Ray. 193, 195 (1890).
I. 85 N.M. 655, 515 P.2d 659 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 639, 515 P.2d
643 (1973).
2. 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977).
3. 614 F. Supp. 969 (D.N.M. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 858 F.2d 618 (10th
Cir. 1988).
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beliefs, are not reasonably sensible, the courts have further held
there is no legal reason to protect that aspect of their privacy
infringed by photography, and no legal remedy available even
if there was justification. 4
These holdings are disturbing not only as a result of their
considerable impact on Indian privacy, but also because they
bode ill for the protection of every aspect of Indian cultural
life. They have already adversely impacted wrongful autopsy
cases, 5 and this may be only the beginning. To the extent that
American Indians may be foreclosed from vindicating their rights
in court because a judge may label Indians as somewhat eccen-
tric, pro tanto, all Americans similarly labeled eccentric will also
be foreclosed from vindicating their own rights in court.
This article, therefore, will try to ascertain whether the courts
have examined these three cases properly, whether the law af-
fords some basis for relief to Indian plaintiffs whose privacy
has been invaded, and whether therefore these holdings might
be overruled on some basis. Proper analysis of this topic is
considerably more complex than is suggested in the opinions of
the three involved courts. In order to accomplish its goals,
therefore, this article contains six sections.
The first section dissects each of the three Indian privacy
portrait cases so that the reader can understand the issues of
the cases, as well as understand how the justices in each case
understood (that is to say misunderstood) those issues. The
second section examines the psychological literature concerning
the psychological nature of privacy. The third section provides
a moral and philosophical rationale for protecting privacy as it
is perceived by humans and not merely for protecting such
economic interests as may appertain thereunto.
The fourth section discusses the law of the tort of invasion
of privacy. This article is limited to privacy torts, not because
the constitutional areas of privacy are thought to be less im-
portant, but because it is to these common law and statutory
torts that persons must look for the protection of their personal
lives from mass publication. Section four first discusses the
Anglo-American law of privacy, then examines certain aspects
of Indian civil law which, as a result of the tribes' inherent
rights of sovereignty to legislate privacy ordinances, may have
4. Bitsie, 85 N.M. at 658-59, 515 P.2d at 662-63; Nelson, 373 A.2d at 1224;
Benally, 614 F. Supp. at 982.
5. Letter from $tephen T. Lecuyer to J. Wm. Moreland (Mar. 26, 1986) (discussing
the topic of the present article).
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some unique bearing on the protection of the privacy of Indian
citizens (i.e., protections are not open to non-Indian plaintiffs).
The fifth section applies the Anglo-American law of privacy
to the facts of the cases dissected in section one, and demon-
strates that the judges who tried these cases -misapplied their
own Anglo-American law of privacy. Finally, the sixth section
draws some conclusions about the necessity for the law to
provide protection to American Indians from the nonconsensual
publication of their portraits.
The American Indian Portrait Cases
The three previously-mentioned cases which directly adjudi-
cated this issue-Bitsie, Nelson, and Benally-all arrived at the
same pernicious holding that American Indians are not reason-
ably sensible. A detailed discussion of each case seems a fruitful
avenue for understanding how the courts involved viewed the
issues.
Bitsie was heard in the District Court of Bernalillo County,
New Mexico in 1973. Oscar Bitsie and his daughter, La Verne
Bitsie, a three-and-a-half-year-old child at the time the cause of
action arose, are members of the Navajo Tribe of Indians. The
Bitsies sued James Walston (an artist), the United Cerebral Palsy
Association, and the Journal Publishing Company of Albuqu-
erque for invading La Verne's privacy by publishing one of
Walton's sketches in the Albuquerque Journal.
The sketch, prepared from a photograph Walston had taken,
was titled La Verne Bitsie, Navajo Girl. The portrait was used
to illustrate an article, in the Journal Fine Arts section of a
Sunday edition, about the Albuquerque Women's Committee of
the United Cerebral Palsy Association. The Committee had
manufactured some note cards which they were selling in an
effort to raise funds for local programs to benefit children with
cerebral palsy. The sketch of La Verne had been printed on one
of the Committee's note cards. La Verne's case was based on
her assertion that all of the activity surrounding her likeness
was conducted without her consent. 6
For quite some time, the Albuquerque Journal had published
articles by specialists in Indian matters, detailing Navajo culture7
and examining how the Navajos' beliefs affected their daily
lives.8 The Journal published these articles because they were of
6. Bitsie, 85 N.M. at 657, 515 P.2d at 661.
7. Id. at 659, 515 P.2d at 663.
8. Id. at 661, 515 P.2d at 665 (Sutin, J., dissenting).
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interest to Indians and non-Indians alike.9 Also, the Journal's
Sunday edition printed a Fine Arts section; it was this section
that precipitated the legal action in this case. 10
In 1970 James and La Verne Walston, the artist and his wife,
had gone to the New Mexico State Fair. While at the fair, the
Walstons toured the Indian Village on the Fairgrounds where
they met Oscar and his daughter, La Verne; the three adults
struck up a conversation." The Walstons commented to Oscar
on the coincidental naming of the two females. They also told
him they thought his daughter was very cute, and asked if they
could photograph little La Verne. Because James Walston failed
to tell Oscar of the use to be made of the photograph, Oscar
consented. Whereupon, La Verne Walston photographed La
Verne Bitsie.12
The following February, James Walston used the photograph
to prepare a sketch of La Verne. Walston mailed a copy of the
sketch to Oscar, but again failed to disclose the ultimate use of
the sketch.' 3
Later that year, the Walston sketch appeared in the Fine Arts
section of the June 27th, Sunday edition of the Albuquerque
Journal, with an article entitled, "Cards by Local Artists to
Benefit Cerebral Palsy Fund." The article stated:
Note Cards designed by five local artists are being sold by
the Women's Committee of United Cerebral Palsy to help
finance a preschool for children afflicted with cerebral palsy.
DESIGNS included are "La Verne Bitsie, Navajo Girl" by
Jim Walston, printed on tan paper. THE CARDS are avail-
able at the United Cerebral Palsy office at 4807 Menaul
NE... Later the cards are to be offered at the United Cerebral
Palsy booth at the State Fair.'4
Oscar was affronted by the article, because he felt it implied
that his daughter was afflicted with cerebral palsy, which she
was not, and additionally because the article associated his
daughter with a serious ailment, and thus meant to him, and to
other traditional Navajo Indians, that the child would be plagued
with misfortune throughout her life.' 5 Further, Oscar was of-
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 660, 515 P.2d at 664 (Sutin, J., dissenting).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
240
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fended because he had not consented to having the portrait
publicized, and because his consent to the photograph of La
Verne was gained only by his having been kept in the dark
about its ultimate use.16
At the trial, in addition to Oscar's testimony of the article's
adverse affects, tribal advocate Benjamin Begay testified there
are more than 20,000 traditional Navajos in New Mexico who
believe that if one's picture is linked with an impairment, one
will be afflicted because harm has been wished on one.' 7 Ad-
ditionally, La Verne's grandmother testified that she was con-
cerned because, in so far as other fund raising campaigns involve
children with serious health problems, it would be reasonable
to believe that La Verne was a similar poster child afflicted with
cerebral palsy."'
The Bitsies argued that the Journal knew or should have
known that its article would be offensive, and that it knew that
it should have asked permission to use La Verne's portrait. The
Bitsies contended first that the Journal had run so many articles
on Navajo culture that the newspaper could hardly help but
know of the Navajo aversion to publication of portraits.
Support for the Bitsies' second contention was provided by a
Journal editor, who testified that on two occasions the news-
paper had obtained written consent to use photographs of chil-
dren. These occasions were in connection with articles concerning
retardation; the subjects were children who were patients in a
hospital, and others who were students at a local school. The
editor also maintained that when articles were written on topics
which a staff member suspected to be offensive to any of the
Journal's readership, the staff person was to tell the editor or
managing editor so as to obtain an authoritative decision on
whether to run the story. The problem in this case was that the
newspaper had no policy covering articles on religious and cul-
tural topics. 19
Unmoved by all this, the trial court held against Bitsie. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, saying:
A traditional belief ... is a cultural feature preserved from
the past .... We cannot, as a matter of law, equate an
offense to persons holding such a belief with an offense to
persons of ordinary sensibilities .... [Tihe tort relates to the
16. Appellant's Brief at 8, Bitsie.
17. Id. at 11-12.
18. Id. at 9-10.
19. Bilsie, 85 N.M. at 660-61, 515 P.2d at 664-65 (Sutin, J., dissenting).
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customs of New Mexico at this time [which is the developed
society on which the interest in privacy is based] and does
not extend to "traditional" beliefs. 20
In holding that Indians are not ordinarily sensible people, the
court implied that the Bitsies believe in superstitious ideas, that
they have been insufficiently socialized to the dominant culture,
and that had they been so, the Bitsies would not have been
affronted. The truth, however, is that, by virtue of his education
and employment records, Oscar Bitsie appears to have been
sufficiently socialized. Oscar, at that time, had been a Gallup-
McKinley County School Systems attendance counselor for seven
years. He held a B.A. in history, and he was earning an M.A.
in guidance and counseling. Nevertheless, Oscar found the article
offensive. 21
The second case, Nelson v. Times2 was heard in the Superior
Court in Penobscot County, Maine in 1977. Peter Anastas
authored a book entitled Glooskap's Children-Encounters with
the Penobscot Indians of Maine. In the book, Anastas used a
picture of Robert Troy Nelson, taken at Robert's reservation
home on Indian Island in Old Town, Maine. The portrait de-
picted Robert from the waist up, smiling, and standing before
the Penobscot river. He was not identified in the newspaper. 2
Beacon Press published the book in 1973, and in February
of that year, the Maine Times newspaper published a review of
the book - a four-page spread that included a reproduction of
Robert's portrait. Neither Robert nor any member of his family
gave permission for the use of his portrait, nor was permission
sought by anyone for its use. The Nelsons came to know of its
use only because the Maine Times serves Old Town, and the
Nelsons noticed the book review.2
Robert brought action for invasion of privacy, contending
that the use of his portrait was unconsented. Additionally, he
argued its use exploited him and the Penobscot Indians for the
pecuniary benefit of Anastas, Beacon Press, and the Maine
Times newspaper.25 In affirming the Superior Court's dismissal
of the case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court characterized the
Penobscot Indians as being people not "possessed of ordinary
20. Id. at 658, 515 P.2d at 662.
21. Id. at 660, 515 P.2d at 664.
22. 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977).
23. Id. at 1224.
24. Id. at 1222; Appellant's Brief at 2, Nelson.
25. Appellant's Brief at 10, Nelson.
[Vol. 15
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feelings and intelligence," so that appropriation of the boy's
likeness could not sound in tort. 6
The third and final case, Benally v. Hundred Arrows Press,27
was heard in the United States District Court for the District
of New Mexico, and was then appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. During the 1930's,
renowned photographer Laura Gilpin traveled extensively
throughout the New Mexico Navajo Indian reservation, accom-
panying a nurse to the tribe. The Navajos trusted her to the
extent that she was allowed to photograph events few other non-
Navajos were allowed to see. 8
In 1932, Lillie Benally, a Navajo woman, allowed Gilpin to
photograph her, dressed in traditional regalia, and her young
son, Norman, in a cradleboard. Gilpin titled the photograph,
taken inside the Benally home, Navajo Madonna. In addition
to exhibiting the portrait on thirty occasions, Gilpin published
the silver print in five books and as a postcard. Despite the
great trust Lillie had for the photographer, Gilpin used Navajo
Madonna without receiving, or even without requesting, consent
from either Lillie or Norman.? Unless Gilpin would have told
them of her uses of their portrait, neither Lillie nor Norman
had any means of discovering how their likenesses were being
used. Their life on the reservation was remote and secluded,
and they had little contact with off-reservation activities. They
simply could not know that Gilpin was exploiting their photo-
graph. 30
Gilpin died in 1979, bequeathing her photographs and per-
sonal papers to the Amon Carter Museum of Western Art. In
1980 and 1981, Hundred Arrows Press, Mediatex Communica-
tions, and Art Magazine Publishers requested copies of Navajo
Madonna from the museum. As is its practice, the museum
asked what uses were to be made of the prints. Upon receiving
the requested information, the museum promptly sent each or-
ganization a copy of the portrait. Unlike the other defendants,
Communication Specialists Inc. (CSI), did not obtain Navajo
Madonna from the museum; like the others, however, CSI made
26. Nelson, 373 A.2d at 1224.
27. 614 F. Supp. 969 (D.N.M. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 858 F.2d 618 (10th
Cir. 1988).
28. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, Exhibit D (Gilpin biography in defendant
Art Magazine Publishers' Southwest Art Magazine at 71), Benally.
29. Benally, 614 F. Supp. at 971-72.
30. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Motions to Dismiss and/or Summary
Judgment of Defendants at 9, Benally.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
no attempt to obtain permission for the use of the photograph
from either Lilie or Norman. Again, Lillie and Norman had
few other avenues of knowing that their likenesses were being
exploited, or by whom, or how they were being exploited.3'
And, indeed, each of the defendants were exploiting Navajo
Madonna to their own ends. Amon Carter Museum was acting
in its capacity as a supplier of art objects and information.
Hundred Arrow Press, Mediatex, and Art Magazine Publishers
published articles concerning Amon Carter Museum of Laura
Gilpin, in which the Benally portrait was used as an illustration.
CSI employed Navajo Madonna in a self-promotional fuli page
advertisement in Four Winds magazine, published by Hundred
Arrow Press. The same issue of Four Winds carried an article
on Gilpin's photography. 32
Lilie's daughter-in-law, Sophie Benally, was shown by her
physician the photograph reproduced in Four Winds. When
Sophie told Lillie and Norman what she had seen, the two were
chagrined-not only because, like other traditional Navajos, they
believed that the unauthorized publication could bring them ill
fortune,33 but also because they had never consented to the
publication of their portrait and had only agreed to sit for the
photo with the understanding that it would not be published.3 4
Additional arguments were offered which the court ignored
in its opinion. While it was stated traditional Navajos believe
that publication of their photographs can have adverse effects
on them, it was also asserted that any reasonable person of
ordinary sensibilities, whether Indian or non-Indian, would have
been offended by publication of the person's portrait taken with
the understanding that the photographer would not publish the
portrait.3 5 The district court, in granting summary judgment for
the defendants, indicated that the Benallys had made no claim
that the publication was offensive to an ordinarily sensible
person, but only that it was offensive to traditional Navajos.
This assertion by the court was, simply, incorrect, as shown by
the Benallys' affidavits.3 6 Quoting Bitsie and Nelson, the court
31.-Benally, 614 F. Supp. at 971-72.
32. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Motions to Dismiss and/or Summary
Judgment of Defendants at 1-29, Benally.
33. Benally, 614 F. Supp. at 971-72.
34. Declaration of Lillie Benally at 1-3.
35. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Motions to Dismiss and/or Summary
Judgment of Defendants at 4, 14, Benally.
36. Benally, 614 F. Supp. at 982; Declaration of Lillie Benally; Declaration of
Grant Benally; Declaration of Sophie Benally.
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concluded that Navajos do not have the ordinary sensibilities of
reasonable people, and that American Indians are not reasonably
sensible people.37
The courts involved in these three cases have indicated that
privacy needs claimed by American Indians are distinguishable
from privacy needs of other Americans in that the former are
based on notions that are not reasonably sensible, and, therefore,
cannot be protected. To test whether such an assertion is correct,
it is necessary to first ascertain what privacy is-psychologically,
morally, philosophically, and legally-and from what elements
a right to privacy is devised from.
The Psychologicai Foundations of Priwacy
It is important that the psychology of privacy be understood
if human privacy is to be adequately protected by the law. As
long as the law recognizes only the economic harms pertaining
to invasions of privacy, and refuses to recognize the psycholog-
ical harms accruing from invasions of privacy, the privacy of
all American citizens is in jeopardy. This section, therefore,
seeks to (1) explicate what privacy means to persons (and not
merely what it means to the law), (2) what purposes privacy
serves in society, and (3) what harms accrue from violations of
privacy.
Diverse psychological investigations have been conducted on
the many aspects of privacy. While the research has not been
directly concerned with the topic of this article, much of it is
nevertheless useful to this discussion. The research cited in this
section deals either with privacy itself, or with a particular aspect
of privacy: territoriality, 8 self-disclosure, 39 intimacy,4° personal
boundaries, 41 self-expression,42 and self-clarification. 43
As one can see from this list, the psychological concept of
privacy is extremely complex. To simplify this discussion, there-
37. Benally, 614 F. Supp. at 981-82.
38. See generally E. T. HAL, THE HIDDEN DmENSION (1966); R. SomimR, PERSONAL
SPACE (1969).
39. See generally Ekman & Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception,
32 PsYcmATRY 88 (1969).
40. See generally Morton, Intimacy and Reciprocity of Exchange: A Comparison
of Spouses and Strangers, 36 J. OF PERSONALT AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 72 (1978).
41. See generally I. ALrTN, THE EvrmoNMNr AND SociAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY,
PERSONAL SPACE, TmurroEL&LrY, CRoWDING (1975).
42. See generally D. PER1m. & P. CozBY, SociAL PSYCHOLOGY (1983).
43. See generally S. DuvAL & R. WicKwND, A THEORY OF O - v SELF-
AwARENEss (1972).
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fore, the term privacy is used throughout, in lieu of the other
terms except where they are necessary for clarification. Addi-
tionally, since the psychological concept of privacy is tied to
psychological concepts of what one's self is, the term self re-
quires explicit definition.44 Self is used in this article to mean
every aspect about an individual which the person considers to
be an integral aspect of the person's status as a unique human
being. This definition of self, as shall be seen, comports well
with the definition of self used in the psychological research
described in the following.
A particularly broad definition of privacy has been provided
by social psychologist I. Altman:
Privacy is conceived of as an interpersonal boundary process
by which a person or group regulates interaction with others.
By altering the degree of openness of the self to others, a
hypothetical personal boundary is more or less receptive to
social interaction with others. Privacy is, therefore, a dynamic
process involving selective control over a self-boundary, either
by an individual or a group.45
The boundary to which Altman refers is merely a hypothetical
construct which symbolizes the notions of personal space and
territory which are those aspects of the environment that indi-
viduals appropriate to their more or less exclusive use, as well
as the notions of personality and personhood which are those
aspects of individuals that make them each unique human be-
ings. This definition of Altman's is, clearly, sufficiently broad
to include not only personal information, but also personal
behavior, and personal accoutrements and effects, including
one's portrait. Altman's notion is that privacy, which he con-
tends is a human need manifested in every society, is an evo-
lutionary outgrowth derived from animal territoriality. 46
Territoriality, the tendency of individuals in some species to
demarcate a particular portion of the environment as their space,
has been observed in any number of animal species, and seems
to be necessary for the well-being of those species and of their
members. 47
There is some research which supports the contention of
privacy being an outgrowth of territoriality. Wynne-Edwards has
44. Altman, supra note 41.
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id.
47. D. PErnummT & P. CozaY, supra note 42.
246
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shown that animals establish zones of privacy which serve to
control the population of a species to avoid overtaxing the
availability of local resources. 48 Hall has shown that these zones
of privacy exist in the human species as well.49 He found that
people have zones of privacy which they make differentially
available for interaction with individuals and with society.
Hall learned that people reserve for interacting with friends
and family an encircling zone which includes their bodies and
extends to four feet around them. The more intimate the friends
or relatives, the closer they allow one another to penetrate this
zone. For mere acquaintances and for formal situations, Hall
discovered that people maintain a distance of between four and
twenty-five feet.50 Additionally, Hall found that the distances of
these zones of privacy vary across cultures, with Americans
maintaining greater distances between individuals than do people
in Latin cultures.5' Moreover, in support of the assertion that
privacy is a basic human need, Westin cites considerable an-
thropological research which demonstrates that all cultures have
some concept of privacy, and that maintenance of privacy is
necessary for the well-being of all societies and of their mem-
bers. 52
Taken together, these findings make it clear that while dif-
ferences in the manifestations of privacy needs are culturally
determined, privacy needs are, nonetheless, inherent in human
beings. Because this point is critical to the present discussion, a
further development of this point follows.
Altman has shown that human responses to invasions of
privacy are considerably more diverse than are the responses of
animals. For example, while animal invasions usually result in
aggression and violence, humans have developed complex social
systems, such as laws and social norms, to control uninvited
encroachments from others. Moreover, while animals tend to
appropriate a few areas to themselves, areas suited to feeding
and mating, people appropriate not only vastly different types
of real estate, such as homes, work stations, and countries, but
also less fixed types of property, such as a particular seat on a
bus, or one's personal papers and effects. People also attach
48. Wynne-Edwards, Self-Regulating Systems in Populations of Animals, 147 Sci-
ENCE 1543, 1543 (1965).
49. Hall, supra note 38.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See generally A. WnVsm, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
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considerations of privacy to their ideas, feelings, and emotions;
such attachments would be difficult to demonstrate in animals.5 3
Research has established that privacy is necessary for personal
well-being in humans. In one study, Altman found that college
dropouts were less effective in controlling their privacy than
were students who continued their education.5 4 In another study,
he noted that societies more often survive and demonstrate
effective functioning when they are able to regulate privacy than
when they are not.55 Fried concurred, showing that psychoso-
matic disorders and depression often accompany loss of privacy
and loss of private space.56
The research in group privacy indicates that privacy is not
necessarily limited to an individual's retiring from society. Rather,
privacy can include individual privacy, as well as matters which,
while partially public, are restricted to a portion of the public,
that is, matters of group privacy-a discussion of which follows.
Privacy then, can be viewed as a state of balance between
matters kept to one's self, kept to a group, and presented to
the general public. Patterson has put forth a hypothesis, com-
posed of physiological arousal, emotional labeling, and approach
and avoidance behaviors, to explain how this balance is main-
taned.57 Patterson hypothesizes that human interaction always
results in changes in the participants' physiological arousal, e.g.,
fluctuations in blood pressure, hormone levels, and body tem-
perature. When an interaction occurs, according to Patterson,
people look to the interaction to account for their level of
physiological arousal. If the participants label the interaction as
bad, such as having their privacy violated, they interpret their
arousal as anger, shame, or the like. If the participants label
the interaction as good, however, such as a pleasurable sharing
of intimacies, they interpret their arousal as contentment, pride,
or the like.5 8
Patterson indicates that a number of variables influence a
person's interpretation of an interaction. Among those variables
53. Altman, supra note 41.
54. Vinsel, Brown, Altman & Foss, Privacy Regulation, Territoriality Displays, and
Effectiveness of Individual Functioning, 39 J. OF PERSONA in & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
1104, 1104 (1980).
55. Altman & Haythorn, The Ecology of Isolated Groups, 12 BHAvioaA, Sc.
169, 169 (1967); Sundstrom & Altman, Field Study of Cominance and Territorial
Behavior, 30 J. oF PERSONAX.=TY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 115, 115 (1974).
56. Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home, in THm URBAN CONDmON (Duhl ed. 1963).
57. Patterson, An Arousal Model of Intimacy, 83 PSYCHOLOOICAL Ray. 235 (1976).
58. Id.
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are the degree of formality of the situation and the degree of
familiarity between the participants. If formality is high and
familiarity is low, for instance, people are more likely to inter-
pret solicitations of personal matters as an invasion of privacy
and they will more likely avoid the soliciting individual. If
formality is low and familiarity is high, however, people are
more likely to interpret such solicitations as desirable opportu-
nities to share intimacies and they will more likely approach the
soliciting individual.59
If Patterson's formulation of privacy regulation is correct,
people must be viewed as active regulators of their individual
levels of privacy. Altman has suggested that when a person's
efforts at privacy regulation are thwarted, feelings of isolation
or feelings of crowding can result.60 Unless the thwarting con-
ditions are alleviated, psychological disorders and physical ill-
nesses can result. This latter assertion is well documented.6'
In contemporary society, a number of circumstances serve to
frustrate privacy regulation. Newspapers and magazines, for
example, are a constant threat to privacy, poised to publicize
one's life in the name of self-defined newsworthiness. 62 And, as
another example, the mere size of the nation's population threat-
ens to overwhelm any attempts to regulate one's privacy. That
is to say, with the advent of national newspapers and magazines,
the mere size of a nation's population, regardless of the popu-
lation density in any given geographical area, is a constant threat
to individual privacy regulation. Obviously, where population
density is high, the threats to privacy regulation are concurrently
increased.
Because it has been shown that privacy needs are manifested
differently according to one's culture, that privacy is necessary
for individual and social health, and that threats to privacy are
always at hand, it seems clear that mechanisms must be devel-
oped to help individuals from divergent backgrounds maintain
a balance between their own privacy needs and the other needs
of a diverse society. This leads us to the discussion of how
people decide what is private and what is public, and how they
decide when they want to be private and when they want to be
gregarious. Altman's concepts of self-boundaries 3 are useful, as
59. Id.
60. Altman, supra note 41.
61. See generally A. BAum, & Y. Epsmn;, HtmiAN RESPONSE TO CROWDING (1978).
62. See infra notes 109-11 & 156-65 and accompanying text.
63. I. ALDum, supra note 41; Altman, Privacy Regulation: Culturally Universal
or Culturally Specific?, 33(3) J. oF Soc. Issuas 66 (1977).
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shall be seen in the following discussion, in clarifying the inter-
relationship between individuals and society in privacy manage-
ment.
Self-boundaries are of two types-private or social-and have
two conditions-open or closed. 4 Private boundaries can be
further divided into one's personal boundary, or a group's
interpersonal boundary. Those aspects of one's self which one
wishes to conceal from everyone can be said to be behind a
closed personal boundary. What one wishes to share only with
a limited number of others can be said to be beyond an open
personal boundary and within a set of overlapping open inter-
personal boundaries (the individual interpersonal boundaries of
each of the participants), but behind a closed social boundary.
Thus, those aspects of one's self which one wishes to share
within a limited community, either two individuals or some other
limited group, are shared in the confidence that they will not
be publicized further. Finally, those aspects of one's self which
one will share with anyone else coincidentally present, such as
a bus ride, or a soap box oration in the park, can be said to
be beyond an open social boundary.
Personal control over these boundaries of privacy is believed
to be essential for individual members of societies to maintain
mental health and to be able to consider themselves unique
human beings (i.e., to develop individuality). All cultures have
evolved complex rules to allow personal control over privacy
boundaries." While it is the case that different cultures have
evolved divergent types of rules, it is possible nevertheless to
draw general conclusions about the goals and ramifications of
the individual and socially approved rules for privacy regulation.
For example, while people typically relinquish their personal
privacy in favor of interpersonal privacy as a result of the
gradual development of some interpersonal relationship,6 excep-
tions to this rule are not hard to imagine. People with similar
recreational interests may find it easy to share many private
experiences of mutual interest, even within the first minutes of
meeting one another. For example, people interested in Olympic
horse riding may freely discuss the minute and embarrassing
64. See generally Derlega & Chaikin, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in Social Rela-
tionships, 33(3) J. oF Soc. IssuEs 102 (1977); S. T. MARGuLIS, PRIVACY AS INFORUATION
MANAGEMENT: A SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONBMENTAL FnAinwoRK (1979).
65. Altman, supra note 63; A. WESTiN, supra note 52.
66. See generally I. Ar.A & D. A. TAYLOR, SOCIAL PENETRATION: THE DEvEL-
opimNT OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS (1973).
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details of falling off their horses during competition. Those
same individuals may not be so forthcoming with people who
do not understand the rigors of their sport. Similarly, people
with vastly different political opinions may find it impossible to
discuss politics, even after having known each other for many
years and having become quite good friends. 'Professional pol-
iticians, however, are much more likely to debate politics with
their political opposites even though the two may be good
friends. In both the general situations and in the exceptions to
the rules, privacy regulation has served to maintain equanimity
between people . The processes involved whereby people decide
when and under what circumstances it is proper for one to
relinquish one's personal privacy in favor of interpersonal pri-
vacy are explained by social penetration theory, promulgated by
Altman and Taylor.6 While this theory is primarily concerned
with how interpersonal relationships develop, it seems applicable
also to a discussion of why people relinquish their interpersonal
privacy in favor of larger social interactions.
Adherents of social penetration theory notice that, in general,
people tend to relinquish their privacy more easily in situations
with which they are familiar than in situations about which they
are unfamiliar. A number of factors contribute to this effect,
including whether the situation is typically pleasant or aversive,
whether other persons involved in the situation are open or
reserved, and whether one feels comfortable in the situation or
feels isolated or crowded. A final contributing factor is the
person's idea of what future similar situations will hold, and
whether such a future is likely to be enjoyable. 68
As people become more familiar with a situation, they relin-
quish their privacy in more areas, to a greater depth in each
area, and for longer periods without becoming uncomfortable.
An important aspect of this theory is that it indicates privacy
is relinquished gradually, starting with areas of less intimacy
and proceeding gradually into areas of increasing intimacy.69
Individuals who are unable to control this process are at great
risk of humiliation should the runaway process enter areas which
they desire to keep private. Individuals are at much less risk
when they closely monitor their relinquishment of privacy, to
discover the outcome of their openness.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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Another pitfall likely to be encountered if privacy regulation
is uncontrolled is that vast amounts of deeply private material
may be exchanged even though the interpersonal relationship
remains quite superficial. Should people in this situation sub-
sequently release material that the other parties find offensive,
they would be at risk of the entire relationship dissolving and
of having their private lives divulged to the world.
It should, by now, be clear that the privacy needs of any
individual human being are in constant flux, changing from time
to time and from situation to situation; changing, in short, as
circumstances change. That one desires privacy now does not
mean that one wishes to never again have human contact. As
Altman has noted, privacy regulation is the regulation of the
amount of human contact we want at any given time. 0 More-
over, as has been seen, personal privacy regulation is absolutely
necessary to the health of people and their societies. Thus, while
effective personal regulation of privacy is a difficult business,
personal regulation of each individual's privacy must be allowed
for by society if our nation is to reap the benefits accruing from
privacy. The allowance must go as far as possible, short of
liquidating other individual's rights.
Some of the benefits which accrue from satisfactory regulation
of privacy are personal expression,7' social validation, 72 and
relationship development. 73 A particular detriment, on the other
hand, which accrues from an individual's thwarted attempts at
privacy regulation, is social manipulation. 4 In other words,
people unable to satisfactorily regulate their privacy needs may
be more easily manipulated than those more adept in this, area.
While relationship development, one of the benefits of pri-
vacy, has already been discussed in connection with Altman, a
few additional comments are in order. Privacy aids in the de-
velopment and maintenance of intimate relationships. Partners
in an intimate relationship disclose secrets to one another, share
experiences, and provide one another with emotional support.75
All of these positive outcomes are a result of the partners'
confidence in each other that what they share in private will go
unpublicized.
70. Altman, supra note 41.
71. S. DuvAL & R. WxcKLaruN, supra note 43.
72. Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 Hum. REL. 117 (1954).
73. Cf. Rubin, Measurement of Romantic Love, 16 J. oF PnRsoNALrr & Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 265 (1970).
74. D. PmuNai' & P. CozBY, supra note 42.
75. Rubin, supra note 73; S. DuvAL & R. W=LcuuNrD, supra note 43.
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Another benefit of privacy is that of social validation. Fes-
tinger has proposed that people examine society to discover the
truth or falsity of their attitudes and beliefs, and the correctness
of their behavior. 76 Among the most effective ways for people
to evaluate themselves is to consult, privately, with their friends
and advisors. Were these private consultations unavailable, many
people would likely be too embarrassed to consult publicly and
would, consequently, be forced to stumble through life, guessing
about the correctness of their attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs.7
A final benefit of privacy is that of improved personal ex-
pression. Duval and Wicklund suggest that ruminating on how
others will view oneself increases self-awareness and makes for
improved personal expression. 78 These authors maintain that a
number of private activities, such as writing a letter or writing
in a diary, or even rehearsing aloud what one is going to say
later, increase self-awareness. With increased self-awareness,
people tend to adjust their thinking; they tend to reduce ambi-
guities and inconsistencies in their thoughts, thereby avoiding
self-criticism as well as the future criticism of others.7 9 These
authors further maintain that increased self-awareness cannot
occur when an individual is actively participating in an inter-
personal situation. Active participation is believed to remove the
person's attention from the self and to shift it to the situation.8 0
Only during a private moment, therefore, can this benefit be
expected to develop.
Having discussed the benefits accruing from privacy, it seems
obvious that society must give special consideration to this right.
The loss of these benefits would surely change for the worse
the social fabric of the nation. Moreover, privacy must be seen
as a unitary concept. When any of the many aspects of privacy
go unprotected, it is apparent that the underlying and unifying
concept of privacy qua privacy is undermined so that all of the
aspects of privacy become threatened. This must not be allowed
to happen, because, the risks to our social fabric are too great.
The Moral Foundations of Privacy
This section examines the moral and philosophical reasons for
protecting the privacy, not only of American Indians, but of all
Americans as well. In deciding to protect privacy, a nation must
ask (1) whose concepts of privacy can be protected, (2) why
76. Festinger, supra note 72.
77. Id.
78. S. DuvA. & R. Vicimut , supra note 43.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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these concepts of privacy should be protected, and (3) how those
concepts of privacy can be protected. The answers to the first
two questions are dealt with in this section. The answer to the
third question is dealt with in the next section.
To summarize what was earlier discussed, an invasion of
privacy is defined for our purposes here as another's unauthor-
ized publicizing of any aspect of one's self which one wishes to
keep private. To publicize is defined as to bring to public
attention or scrutiny, or to subject to public interference; and
the public is defined as anyone not privy to an aspect of one's
private self. Thus, a person who apprehends one's private cir-
cumstance, but who engages in no further publicizing, never-
theless has invaded one's privacy; if further publicizing is
conducted, privacy has been invaded. Obviously, not every in-
vasion of privacy can be protected against. Protection, however,
is a matter for the law, and it is moral responsibility with which
this section is concerned.
Historically, Western philosophers have been silent on the
moral foundation of a right to privacy, and most early discus-
sions of privacy have come from the American legal field.8 A
legal right to privacy first articulated as recently as 1890 by
lawyers Warren and Brandeis in their seminal article, The Right
to Privacy, which appears to have been an outgrowth of inva-
sions by newspapers into Warren's private life.82 Because of the
innumerable quotes from, and references to, the article, Breck-
enridge has called it "the most influential article published [on
privacy as a right]"R Accordingly, Warren's and Brandeis's
argument is summarized here.
Warren and Brandeis argued that the right which privacy
protects, what they termed "the right to be let alone,"' 4 had
always been protected, at least to some extent, by the common
law. The reason they put forth to explain the late recognition
of this right was that, previously, invasions of one's private life
had been difficult to implement, so that the few violations that
did occur were remedied through existing law by recourse to
legal fictions. However, with the technological advances existing
even in 1890, invasions of people's private lives had become so
81. H. J. McCloskey, Privacy and the Right to Privacy, 55 Pminosopny 37, 37
(1980).
82. J. BRECKENRIDGE, Tim RiHr To PRVAcY 133-52 (1970).
83. Id. at 132.
84. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAtv. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890)
(quoting 2 CooLEY ON ToRTs 29).
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commonplace as to warrant the law's stepping in to provide
explicit protection of privacy.8 5
Warren and Brandeis observed-and later psychological re-
search bore them out 86-that persistent invasion of privacy "de-
stroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No
enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under
its blighting influence." 87 After discussing a number of legal
fictions under which privacy had already been afforded some
limited protection, Warren and Brandeis asserted that the prin-
ciple involved in the right of privacy is that of "inviolate
personality," 88 and the "general right to the immunity of the
person, the right to one's own personality."8 9 They asserted also
that the protections of privacy "are rights as against the world, 9
and called on the American legal community to take note.91
A considerable span of time elapsed, however, before the
right which Warren and Brandeis had uncovered was generally
recognized. Indeed, privacy remains a judicially disfavored rem-
edy because it conflicts with first amendment guarantees of free
speech and free press. Despite the judicial disapproval, tort
actions in privacy are increasingly being brought concurrently
with the increasing abilities of individuals and newsgathering
organizations to violate other people's privacy.92
As a result of the increased interest in privacy, a number of
people have attempted to ascertain whether privacy is a basic
right which stands on its own, or a derivative right which serves
to protect other, more basic rights. 93 As Caplan has pointed out,
were privacy no more than "a derivative moral concept," the
need for its protection would be greatly decreased, and protec-
tion of the more basic rights would be most appropriate. 94
While some authors argue that privacy is a derivative right,
others maintain it is a basic right. Caplan metaphorizes this
debate as an "exciting ethical safari during which numerous
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 38-78 and accompanying text.
87. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 84, at 196.
88. Id. at 205.
89. Id. at 207.
90. Id. at 213.
91. Id. at 220.
92. See W. PRossmE & W. KEEToN, ON ToRts: LAwYER'S ED. § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
93. See generally 55 PHmosoPHy 315 (1980) (entire issue vas dedicated to this
question).
94. Caplan, On Privacy and Confidentiality in Social Science Research, in ErMcA.
Isstms un SocLAL SemNcE REsEARCH 315, 315 (T.L. Beauchamp, R.A. Faden, R.J.
Wallace, Jr. & L. Walters eds. 1981).
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thorny cases will be slashed clear, many conceptual pitfalls
avoided, and terrifying counter examples wrestled into logically
consistent submission ... result[ing] in undersized or worthless
conceptual trophies.19 5 As Caplan sees it, psychological, socio-
logical, and anthropological data demonstrate well that privacy
is a basic human need; ergo, privacy must be considered a basic
human right.6 This seems an altogether acceptable view, partic-
ularly in light of the considerable harms accruing from'the loss
of privacy.w
If privacy is in fact a basic human need, then privacy is a
basic human right. That is to say, if privacy is a basic human
need, like food, water, and shelter, then one's privacy deserves
protection, like one's food, water, and shelter. While it may be
that people are not required to provide non-dependents with
food, water, or shelter, it is only under limited circumstances
that anyone can take others' food, water, or shelter away from
them. Similarly, while it may be that people are not required to
provide others with privacy, it should be only under limited
circumstances that anyone can take others' privacy away from
them. In other words, it should be only under limited circum-
stances that anyone's privacy can be invaded and violated with
impunity.
Privacy's status as a basic moral right notwithstanding, its
conflict with free speech and free press98 remains. Conflicts of
rights so basic to American society as privacy on the one hand
and free speech and press on the other can be resolved only by
recourse to moral value judgments. Before making such judg-
ments, however, we should examine the process of making moral
value judgments.
One of the greatest difficulties encountered when making
moral judgments involving people from different cultures must
surely be ethnocentricity, i.e. the belief that one's own culture
is superior to others. If ethnocentric people sit in the position
of decision maker, a nondiscriminatory decision is nearly im-
possible, particularly in situations of unequal power between the
cultures. Where such a situation exists, close attention should
be given to safeguards which will ensure that the weaker culture
is not victimized outright by the dominant culture. In any event,
if the members of the dominant culture have any wish at all to
95. Id. at 316.
96. Id. at 319-21, 325.
97. Id.
98. U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
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behave in an upright manner, it is no good for them to dismiss
entirely the needs and expectations of the members of other
cultures who will be affected by the majoritarian decisions.99
Lamont, a civil libertarian and free speech and free press
advocate, has written extensively on the elements of moral judg-
ment, and his ideas are instructive to this discussion. As Lamont
has pointed out, regardless of the ultimate source of morality,
it is safe to say that the moral system of any human society is
a result of social excogitation.'10 That is to say, regardless of
wherever individuals receive their personal sense of right and
wrong, the consensual morality of a society is the result of the
application of reason and logic to the contemporary problems
of the society. This is how the formal process of the common
law works, and it is how the informal process of social morality
works.
Such a conceptualization of morality should not be too dif-
ficult for anyone to accept. The English word morality comes
from the Latin moris meaning custom, and ethics comes from
the Greek ethos, also meaning custom. Thus, when we speak of
a society's morals, we are speaking of its customs concerning
correct behavior. As Lamont makes clear, this argument does
not imply that moral standards of conduct are subjective. It
does imply, however, that human understanding of these stan-
dards is imperfect and in constant flux. Just as we learn from
the successes and failures of earlier moral systems, so too, future
generations will learn from ours.'0 ' To demonstrate that morality
grows dated in the fullness of time, and that as technology
changes society there is a concurrent change in morality, Lamont
cites the automobile. 10 2 While previously it mattered little where
one drove one's cart, it is now morally incorrect to drive one's
car on the wrong side of the road. Lamont also instances modem
medicine in this context. 03
The advance of technology and the coming together of Indian
and non-Indian cultures have interacted to create a complexity
of moral questions, the satisfactory resolution of which can be
had only through the type of flexible approach Lamont advo-
cates. While it may be a grander practice to proclaim moral
ideals, such a practice is doomed to failure,' °4 in the present
99. See C. LAMONT, THE PnmOsoPmY OF Humiu'nsm 240-41 (6th ed. 1952).
100. Id. at 231-36.
101. rd. at 233.
102. Id. at 234.
103. Id. at 233.
104. Id. at 235.
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context, and. virtually assures increased hostility between the
culture groups. Proclaiming the freedom of the American press
to be superior to the privacy of the American Indians is no
solution to the real dilemma.
Like the solution to all moral dilemmas, resolving the conflict
of free press and privacy involves sorting out the correct inter-
relation of means and ends. 0 5 Lamont states that it is surely
impossible that any end could justify any means. Nevertheless,
it is equally true that particular ends can justify particular
means.' 6 This is not to make a utilitarian argument for moraljudgment. Rather, it is to say that once society has come to
some consensus as to which ends are desirable, it must then
decide among the means available for achieving its goals.
Lamont argues that one cannot make a meaningful choice
among means until all of the ramifications of the separate means
are well understood, by engaging in, something like a cerebral
environmental-impact or social-impact study. He asserts, there-
fore, that society cannot know whether a certain course of action
is best until it has examined not only the effects of that course,
but also the consequences of not following that course and the
ramifications of following alternative courses. 0 7 Finally, Lamont
argues that the means-ends dichotomy is false, that achieving
one end is merely a means of achieving another end. 08
In the present discussion, there are two ends under consid-
eration: privacy and free press. It should be recognized that
while these are desirable ends in themselves, they are also means
to the ends of a healthy society and a free society. The question
to be answered, then, is not which of these basic rights should
take pre-eminence, but under what circumstances and to what
extent should each be afforded pre-eminence over the other.
Certainly, a free press is necessary for achieving and main-
taining an open and honest government, and an open and free
society. But are these ends sought only for their own sake, or
as means to the citizenry's pursuit of happiness? Surely, the
latter must be the case. If this is the case, then the press cannot
be allowed to go trampling down all semblances of privacy,
thereby obliterating any hope of true happiness, all in the name
of facilitating the pursuit of happiness. Conversely, society can-
not become so private that it becomes closed and repressive,
105. Id.
106. Id. at 236.
107. Id. at 237-38.
108. Id. at 238.
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thereby also obliterating any hope of true happiness, all in the
name of facilitating happiness. Society must strike a balance
between these competing interests.
The common law's recognition of a need for balance was the
origin of the newsworthiness doctrine. 19 Briefly, the newswor-
thiness doctrine states that if something is a legitimate news
item, its communication by a news agency is privileged and a
remedy for damages may not be had. The problem with the
doctrine is that it essentially leaves the news agencies to decide
what is newsworthy," 0 a prime example of setting the fox to
guard the hen house. Under this doctrine, unwilling people can
be dragged before the public through no fault of their own,
even if they have not accidentally put themselves in a locality
of legitimate public interest."' News agencies, quite obviously,
need more guidance.
Again we come to the question of means and ends. It seems
-clearly correct that an open and .free society, governed by an
open and honest government, is that society which would make
its people the happiest; that a free press is the necessary means
to these ends and that while presently we do not have these
ends, if we continue with a free press we probably will someday.
Free press professionals, however, appear to add something
which is less clearly correct: if the trip to Utopia entails some
people's privacy being violated along the way, that is to be
deeply regretted. However, to use that as an excuse for encum-
bering the press would be to hinder or halt our approach to the
desired ends, and that must not be allowed."2 Lamont refers to
this latter type of argument as future-worship,"3 and he main-
tains it causes
the neglect of [individuals]'s present rights to happiness and
their immediate opportunities for it. If human beings are to
be happy and to enjoy life, it must always be during some
period describable as now. What the future-worshippers do
is to ask each succeeding generation to sacrifice itself in
working exclusively on behalf of a distant Utopia that may
or may not some day arrive. From the viewpoint of human
109. W. PROSSER & W. KEEToN, supra note 92, at 853; see also infra notes 156-65
and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying note 62.
110. See D. Gn.utoRE & J. BARxoN, MASS ComtmicAo'N LAw 331-46 (4th ed.
1984).
111. See supra note 1.
112. D. GrLmoRo & J. BARRON, supra note 110, at 331-46.
113. C. LAMONT, supra note 99, at 239.
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happiness and the sum total of good, today is just as signif-
icant as tomorrow and the current year just as significant as
any a decade hence."4
It is to Lamont's "now" that this article is aimed.
If people are not to be mere means employed by the press to
its own ends, regardless of how laudable those goals may be,
and if human happiness is not to be completely sacrificed to
the convenience of the press, then the press must be curtailed
from publicizing that which is not public, and from making into
public figures those who are merely private persons. Judge Sutin,
in his dissenting opinion in Bitsie, made a proper case for such
curtailment of press activities." 5
Judge Sutin suggested that in the absence of authorization,
private speech made public merely to increase the publicizers'
income should not be protected, and should be actionable. This
rule would include photographers attempting to sell or exhibit
portraits for which authorization of the sale or exhibition had
not been obtained from the subject, as well as newspapers and
magazines attempting merely to increase their circulation and
thus their income. Judge Sutin's rule would also include non-
profit organizations selling the portraits for immediate financial
gain or to enhance their status so as to increase their chances
of securing monetary or other types of grants.
Judge Sutin's rule seems entirely justifiable on moral grounds.
People should be prohibited from violating one's "inviolate
personality" merely for their own gain. That is to say, people
should be prohibited from using one's private life as a means
to their pecuniary ends. Moreover, what is said in this article
concerning the press is that much more applicable to those other
invaders of privacy who are that much less constitutionally
protected.
Finally, an argument can be made for the benefits which
would accrue to journalism were journalists more prone to
respect privacy. In the past decade or so, social scientists have
devoted considerable energy to the issue of privacy of research
subjects.116 The result of this soul searching has been the begin-
nings of the development of techniques and procedures that
result not only in maintaining subjects' privacy, but also in
114. Id.
115. Bitsie v. Walston, 85 N.M. 655, 659-63, 515 P.2d 659, 663-67 (Sutin, J.,
dissenting).
116. See generally EimcA Issuas m SocAL ScmNCE RE sE RcH (T.L. Beauchamp,
R.A. Faden, R.J. Wallace, Jr. & L. Walters eds. 1981) [hereinafter ETncAL. IssuEs].
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better science.1 7 Were journalists to devote some small fraction
of their energies to this problem, similar advances are quite
likely for their field. If the media are not willing to initiate this
soul searching, however, the courts will need to help the press
begin.
The Legal Foundations of Privacy
This section discusses the Anglo-American law of the tort of
invasion of privacy, as well as certain aspects of Indian civil
law which have some unique bearing of the protection of the
privacy of Indian plaintiffs; i.e., protections not open to non-
Indian plaintiffs. It is important to understand how the law has
protected privacy in the past, if we are to understand how these
protections must be implemented to protect privacy in the Indian
portrait context. Moreover, it is important to understand what
Indian tribes can do in the area of privacy protection, if we are
to understand what they must do to protect the privacy of their
members.
Anglo-American Law
Warren and Brandeis were the first authors to articulate the
status of privacy as a right when, in 1890, they published their
seminal article, The Right to Privacy."8 While the apocryphal
and condescending remark has been made that Warren and
Brandeis invented the right to privacy, the cases they cite dem-
onstrate well that such a remark is, quite simply, wrong.
Warren and Brandeis cited a number of English cases, in-
cluding the 1849 case Prince Albert v. Strange,"9 which held
that reproducing the Prince's etchings violated common law
rules.' 20 The authors quoted Lord Gottenham as relying on Lord
Eldon's opinion in Wyatt v. Wilson to say, "privacy is the right
invaded."112' In Wyatt, an 1820 case reported in a manuscript
note,' z2 the court had prohibited the publication of an engraving
of an ill George the Third.'1' Warren and Brandeis cited a
117. Id.; Caplan, On Privacy and Confidentiality in Social Science Research, in
ETmcAL Issuas, supra note 116, at 315; Boruch, Methodsfor Resolving Privacy Problems
in Social Research, in id. at 292.
118. BREcKENUmE, supra note 82, at 132.
119. 1 McN. & G. 25 (1849).
120. 'Warren & Brandeis, supra note 84, at 202-04.
121. Id. at 205.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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subsequent case, Tuck & Sons v. Priester,124 to show that owners
of a photograph have a right to have reproductions made of it
without fearing that their contractors will make reproductions
for themselves.' Finally, the authors cited an 1888 case, Pollard
v. Photogiaphic Co., 26 in which the defendant, a portrait pho-
tographer, was prohibited, due to a breach of confidence, from
displaying or marketing reproductions of the plaintiff's por-
trait. 27
Clearly, Warren and Brandeis did not in any sense "invent"
the right to privacy. Moreover, they were correct when they said
in 1890, "the existing law affords a principle, [that of inviolate
personality,] which may be invoked to protect the privacy of
the individual from invasion-by the too-enterprising photog-
rapher, or the possessor of any other modern device for record-
ing or reproducing scenes . . . ."28 They were further correct
when they said that in applying the right to privacy, "the law
has no new principle to formulate ... -129
If Warren and Brandeis did not invent the right to privacy,
what did they do? They developed a new theory to protect, not
new interests, but new violations of old interests which previ-
ously had not often been violated, but which were being increas-
ingly violated by more inventive means. Since the means of
violating privacy have continued to become increasingly inven-
tive, subsequent to Warren's and Brandeis' article, protecting
privacy has become concurrently more important.
The subsequent development of this tort has been rocky,
which in turn has made the development of a legal theory of
privacy equally rocky. 30 In 1960, Prosser devised from case law
an inadequate and inconvenient classification of "a complex of
four" torts, 13 which will be discussed later in this section.
Prosser's classification is inadequate because it does not account
for the subsequent development of constitutional protections of
privacy,3 and because it fails to consider the underlying ration-
ale of a right to privacy: that people have a right to keep their
private lives private.
124. 19 Q.B.D. 639 (1887).
125. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 84, at 208.
126. 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888).
127. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 84, at 208.
128. Id. at 206.
129. Id. at 213.
130. W. PRossER & W. KEEToN, supra note 92, at 851.
131. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CArn. L. REv. 389 (1960); see supra text accompanying
notes 135-70.
132. W. PROSSER & W. KEaTON, supra note 92, at 851.
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The classification is inconvenient because it does not account
for the considerable overlap of the torts. For example, if a
reporter-photographer were allowed onto a private estate to
report on award-winning roses, but while there secretly covered
a private gathering and subsequently published an article accom-
panied by embarrassing photographs, with a text that was truth-
ful but embarrassing and so incomplete as to cast the participants
in a false light, the journalist would have violated all four torts.
Moreover, Prosser's classificatory scheme has led to doctrinal
confusion. In the Indian privacy cases, for example, the courts
have treated the four torts as one, thereby defeating the plaintiffs
who had sought to establish evidence of distinct tortious con-
duct. While this confusion is not directly attributable to Prosser
himself, nevertheless it is a direct outgrowth of his attempt to
protect only the economic harms of invasions of privacy, rather
than attempting to protect privacy itself. 33
Nevertheless, since the Restatement (Second) of Torts has
accepted Prosser's four torts concerning the right to privacy, 34
they will be discussed. Prosser's four torts are as follows: "De-
fendant's appropriation of Plaintiff's name or likeness for De-
fendant's gain .... Defendant's intrusion into Plaintiff's
solitude, seclusion, or private affairs .... Defendant's giving
highly objectionable publicity to Plaintiff's private con-
cerns .... Defendant's giving publicity to Plaintiff which casts
Plaintiff in a false light .... ,,135
Before discussing Prosser's torts, however, it is worthwhile to
discuss an absolute defense against them. Consent is said to be
an absolute defense to any invasion of privacy. 36 Prosser's
review of the cases, however, indicates that limited consent is
only a defense if it is not exceeded. Where consent is exceeded,
to that extent liability is incurred. In those states where privacy
is protected by statute, the statutes require that consent be in
writing. In those states where privacy is protected by the com-
mon law, consent must be reasonable to infer. 37 These are
important questions for the Indian cases under discussion be-
cause the plaintiffs involved had consented to being photo-
graphed only, and not to having their photographs publicly
133. Id. § 117.
134. Nelson v. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 n.2 (Me. 1977); see Introduction,
R TATEmNT (SEcoND) oF TORTS at VII, VIII (1977).
135. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
136. W. PROSSER & W. KErTON, supra note 92, at § 117.
137. Id.
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exposed. 38 Since this section is meant solely to illuminate the
murky law of privacy applicable to these cases, further consid-
eration of the role of consent in them is postponed awhile. 13 9
For now, each tort will be taken up separately.
Defendant's Appropriation of Plaintiff's Name
or Likeness for Defendant's Gain
The strength of Warren's and Brandeis' argument notwith-
standing, their tort failed in its first test, Robertson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co. 40 The defendants in Robertson had caused the
plaintiff's portrait to be placed on its boxes, for which the
plaintiff sued because she had not consented to such use of her
portrait. The New York Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 split, failed
to find a common law protection of privacy and indicated that
such protection would need to be statutory. The vigor of the
Robertson dissent, coupled with a public outpouring against the
decision, created an atmosphere which convinced 4' the New
York Legislature to pass the needed statute the following year. 42
Three years later, the Georgia Supreme Court became the
first court to recognize a common law right to privacy in
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. 43 The defendants
in Pavesich had placed a newspaper advertisement containing
the plaintiff's photograph, without having gained the plaintiff's
consent to use him in such a manner.
Prosser maintains that there are two elements to this tort: the
plaintiff must be clearly identified, and the appropriation must
be to the benefit of the defendant. 44 The benefit need not be
monetary, except where stipulated by statute. 45 For the purposes
of the identification element, names and likenesses are treated
differently. With names, it must not appear that the defendant
used a name which, coincidentally, was also the plaintiff's name.
The defendant must be shown to have known the plaintiff's
name and to have used it to misidentify the plaintiff in some
manner.14 This problem does not occur with a photographic
138. See supra text accompanying notes 6-37.
139. See infra text accompanying note 199.
140. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
141. W. PROSSER & W. KEETo, supra note 92, at 850-51.
142. 1903 N.Y. Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (codified as amended at N.Y. C. RIGHTS
LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976)).
143. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
144. W. PROSSER & W. KanroN, supra note 92, at 853.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 852.
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portrait, however, for obvious reasons. The second element is
satisfied if the plaintiff can show that the portrait was employed
to accomplish the defendant's purposes, other than the mere
dissemination of information. 147 This provision exists to balance
privacy with free speech and free press. Thus, for authors and
publishers, the use of another's likeness must be for more than
merely incidental use as an illustration of an article or book,
even though the production of the article or book was for the
pecuniary gain of the defendant. That is, there must be shown
some deliberate attempt to capture the portrait's value, 48 and
even then, it is probably necessary to show that there were other
illustrations available which would have served as well. Two
cases serve to illustrate these latter points.
In Raible v. Newsweek,149 the plaintiff's picture was taken
under the pretext that it would be used in an article about
patriotic Americans. In fact, however, Newsweek magazine used
the photo in an article about bigots. Even though the plaintiff
had not objected to his being photographed, the case turned on
whether he had agreed to the use to which the photograph was
put. In 1977, the United States Supreme Court recognized this
tort in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., ° in which
the Court allowed recovery to the plaintiff for the defendant's
having broadcast, in the evening news, Zacchini's entire human
cannonball performance. Zacchini makes it clear that there is
only limited constitutional protection for news agencies to ap-
propriate one's likeness. As a result of the increased recognition
of the misappropriation aspect of the invasion of privacy, most
news agencies have developed standard consent forms to protect
themselves.' 5
Defendant's Intrusion into Plaintiffs Solitude,
Seclusion, or Private Affairs
Unlike misappropriation, intrusion does not involve publica-
tion so it does not involve any constitutional protections at all.
Intrusion is defined as follows:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
147. Id. at 853-54.
148. Id. at 853.
149. 341 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
150. 433 U.S. 562 (1977), remanded, 54 Ohio St. 2d 286, 376 N.E.2d 582, 8 Ohio
St. 3d 265.
151. D. GmruioRE & J. BAR~oN, supra note 110, at 366.
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concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person [including:] surreptitious surveillance, [and]
trespass, [or] where consent to enter [a] secluded setting has
been exceeded.' 52
A major intrusion case is Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,153 which
involved a couple of reporters who posed as patients to gather
information substantiating the plaintiff's alleged medical quack-
ery. The court held that such falsification of purpose made the
defendants liable regardless of the nobility of their true purpose.
In another case, Galella v. Onassis,5 4 the defendant photogra-
pher doggedly pursued the plaintiff, to her distress. Onassis was
allowed recovery and an injunction against Galella's further
pursuing her because of the outrageous nature of his intrusion
into her private sphere.
Prosser maintains that these cases turn on the manner in
which privacy is invaded and the purpose for which it is invaded.
"If the means used is abnormal in character for gaining access
to private [concerns]," or the purpose is unwarranted, then
otherwise allowable behavior becomes actionable. 55
Defendant's Giving Highly Objectionable
Publicity to Plaintiffs Private Concerns
Warren and Brandeis wrote their article largely to bring about
protection from publication of private facts which are not of
legitimate public concern. Ironically, this type of case has be-
come the most difficult to prosecute. In addition to other con-
stitutional restrictions, "unreasonable publicity given to private
facts" may be defended against by the doctrine of newsworthi-
ness; that is, a matter of legitimate public interest. Judges seem
to prefer application of the newsworthiness doctrine to all pri-
vate-facts cases because it allows for first amendment freedoms,
and because the court need not decide what is newsworthy15 6
The newsworthiness doctrine, however, is fraught with difficul-
ties. It threatens to destroy all of the plaintiffs' rights, not only
152. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 652B (1977).
153. 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
154. 533 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
155. W. PROSSER & W. KaaiToN, supra note 92, at 856.
156. M. G1Lumo & J. BAuRoN, supra note 110, at 331-46; see also supra notes
109-11 and accompanying text, and supra text accompanying note 62.
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in this area but also in every aspect of privacy, 57 and it has
been applied inconsistently.
For example, in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., s8 the plaintiff
had been a child prodigy in mathematics and received consid-
erable public attention. Years later an article was published
about him detailing his mundane life, including his attempts to
stay out of the public eye. A remedy was denied the plaintiff
because he was said to be still newsworthy. In Virgil v. Sports
Illustrated,59 however, a remedy was awarded in a case con-
cerning an article which discussed the highly colorful life of a
currently popular surfing star.
Originally, Prosser agreed that this tort was to protect private
facts only.'6 Later, however, Prosser stated, "But merely be-
cause a face is one that occurred at a public place and in the
view of the general public . .. does not mean that it should
receive widespread publicity if it does not involve a matter of
public concern."' 61 Moreover, relying on Time, Inc. v. Hill, and
Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, Prosser indicated that while the
constitutional protections of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments might cover publicizing matters of public record, they do
not protect publicizing matters, whether private or public, which
are not on any public record. 62
Cases involving disclosures of private facts are further com-
plicated by notions of public and private persons. Some people
seek notoriety, while others have it thrust upon them, if only
to a limited degree. To the extent that one has come before the
public eye, one has lost a degree of privacy. While public figures,
even limited public figures, may receive pertinent publicity with-
out liability being incurred, it is impermissible to drag purely
private persons before the public and then claim they are public
persons. It is this invasion of privacy which Warren and Brandeis
sought particularly to protect.
Nevertheless, except in California, 63 the latitude afforded the
press by the newsworthiness doctrine threatens to consume this
tort. If this should happen, the worst fears of Warren and
157. See generally Kalvin, Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?,
31 L. & CoNTbP. PRons. 326 (1966). See also supra notes 109-11 and accompanying
text, and supra text accompanying note 62.
158. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
159. 424 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
160. W. PRossER & W. KXaro, supra note 92, at 858-59.
161. Id. at 859.
162. Id. at 863.
163. See generally Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
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Brandeis may yet be realized. In addition, because competing
basic rights are involved, balancing those rights, as was done in
Virgil, is by far more appropriate than applying a mechanical
rule which does no more than cause judicial indolence. As the
court said in Virgil, "Where competing values are involved...
unless [the plaintiff] is to be sacrificed outright ... [the press]
must accept that risks are inherent and the problem lies in
attempting to minimize them to the extent that the conflict
permits."' 64 Finally, it has been recommended that reporters
eschew for themselves the intrusive techniques which they have
so often criticized the government for employing. 65
Defendant's Giving Publicity to Plaintiff
Which Casts Plaintiff in a False Light
Prosser states that this tort is involved, inter alia, when one's
portrait is used as a book or article illustration, falsely implying
a connection between the writing and the plaintiff.16 As it turns
out, false light was the first privacy tort to come before the
United States Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill.167 The Court
applied to this tort the actual malice standard of defamation
from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.68 Subsequently, however,
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' 69 the Court drew a distinction
between public and private citizens, and indicated that the states
have some latitude in setting standards of liability for defamation
of private citizens. While the states are not allowed to employ
strict liability, they are not required to employ actual malice
either. The Court has not extended this distinction to privacy
cases, but there is every reason that given the proper facts, it
should.
It has been speculated that the Court would be reluctant to
extend the public-private distinction to privacy because it did
not do so in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. °70 In Cantrell,
however, journalistic outrages were so glaring, and actual malice
so manifest, that the Court held not only were the reporters
liable but also their publishers. The Court, therefore, had no
opportunity to extend the public-private distinction to privacy.
It seems entirely likely, consequently, that the Court would allow
164. Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286, 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
165. D. GnaisoRE: & J. BARRON, supra note 110, at 362.
166. W. PROSSBR & W. KEETON, supra note 92, at 864.
167. 385" U.S. 374 (1967).
168. 376 U.S. 254, motion denied, 376 U.S. 967 (1964).
169. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
170. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
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an actual malice standard for public persons, but a negligence
standard for private persons. This leads us to a discussion of
the specific remedies available to American Indians by virtue of
actions from the tribal governments.
American Indian Law
It is not entirely unlikely, in view of the ethnocentric opinions
in the portrait cases under review, that Indian plaintiffs will be
denied a favorable judgment when they bring an invasion of
privacy before a state or federal court. In that eventuality, it
might be necessary for the tribes to exercise their inherent rights
of sovereignty to legislate privacy ordinances along the lines
suggested in Sullivan and Gertz, and to render judgments against
Indian and non-Indian defendants who violate the privacy of
Indians on Indian lands. This measure would require, of course,
that some tribes adopt as part of their code, inter alia, a
provision allowing nonconsensual jurisdiction over non-Indians.
It would also require, in some states, retrocession of civil juris-
diction to the tribes. The remainder of this discussion assumes
those requirements to be met.17'
Since the Indian Reorganization Act provided for the resto-
ration of tribal governmental status and powers (e.g., the res-
toration to the tribes of their sovereignty in the use of their
legislative and judicial powers 72), tribal rights to legislate privacy
protection are apparently secure. This leaves the question of
tribal judicial jurisdiction over various parties to render judg-
ments entitled to full faith and credit.
73
While Williams v. Lee 74 established that exclusive jurisdiction
is given to tribal courts in civil suits arising in Indian country
and involving Indian defendants, jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants-that is, Williams in reverse-has not been decided.
Nevertheless, such jurisdiction is probable. Tribal judicial sov-
ereignty was established in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe 75
Subsequently, in Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,7 6 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized tribal powers to tax non-
Indians on tribal lands. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes
171. See generally F. CoHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDiA- LAWv 145 (1982 ed.).
172. 25 U.S.C. § 476-(1970).
173. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 n.21 (1978).
174. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
175. 129 F. Supp. 15 (W.D.S.D. 1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
176. 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958).
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of the Colville Indian Reservation,177 the Court supported Barta
by refusing to extend to the imposition of tribal sales taxes the
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 78 exclusion of non-Indian
criminal defendants from the jurisdiction of the tribes. Moreo-
ver, in United States v. Mazurie,"79 the Court recognized the
tribes' inherent civil authority over non-Indians engaged in ac-
tivities in Indian country which affect the health and welfare of
the Indians. And, in Montana v. United States,80 the Court
extended this authority to all reservation lands. Finally, the rule
in Williams v. Lee gives jurisdiction to the tribes on any matter
threatening Indians' rights, and loss of privacy certainly threat-
ens Indians' rights. If this analysis is correct, the tribal courts
should have jurisdiction in all privacy invasions involving Indian
plaintiffs except those involving defendants who are residents of
another state and who remove the trial to federal district court. 8'
If defendants are residents of another state, actions could
well be removed to federal court under the diversity provisions. 82
Unfortunately, Williams v. Lee has placed considerable limita-
tions on federal diversity claims involving Indian affairs because
the federal courts, sitting as an alternative to the state courts,
have had to apply state law.8 " The federal courts, therefore,
serve as nothing more than surrogates for state interference in
tribal affairs. Interference in tribal affairs, however, is prohib-
ited by Williams v. Lee. Consequently, federal courts will hear
only those diversity cases which could have been brought in
state court had diversity not been involved. 84
This is too much! Even though diversity is based on state
residence,'8 5 this difficulty is clearly anachronistic and should be
of historical interest only. Applying state law in cases arising
on Indian lands, as happened in Benally, violates the Tribal
Self-Determination policy, it violates Williams v. Lee, and, if a
federal district court refuses to hear a case, applying state law
in cases arising on Indian lands leaves injuries without a forum
in which to be heard. Therefore, it should stop.
177. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
178. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
179. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
180. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1988).
182. Id, id. § 1332.
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948); Eiie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938).
184. E.g., Hot Oil Serv. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966); Littel v. Nakai, 344
F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966).
185. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
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Federal courts should sit as alternatives to tribal courts when
the cause of action arises on Indian lands. In other words, for
purposes of diversity and choice of law, states should be inter-
preted to include Indian tribes. How else are Indians "to make
their own laws and be governed by them,"' 18 6 in cases involving
diversity of citizenship? As Benally indicates, people are descend-
ing upon the reservations from all parts of the nation, disturbing
the peace and violating the privacy of the Indian residents. If
Indian plaintiffs can get no satisfaction from state law, does it
matter who applies it? If Indian tribes are to be able to protect
themselves and their members from invasions of privacy, and
from a host of other ills as well, this diversity problem needs
rethinking and reinterpreting.
A somewhat related issue is the weight to be accorded tra-
ditional Indian beliefs. The courts, in the portrait cases, have
indicated that American Indian traditional beliefs have no place
in American society or in American law, and, by implication,
that American Indians have no place in America. This position
is not new.
Any number of policies, in America, have attempted to sup-
press 'Indian cultures and traditional beliefs. Government agents
have conspired with missionaries to convert and civilize Indi-
ans.' s Whole tribes have been dispossessed of their sacred lands
and of their traditional hunting and fishing grounds, to be
compensated with far distant reservations"" where missionary
societies were granted large tracts of the reservations' lands, 1 9
and where Indian children were required to attend missionary
schools at distances days from home. 9' As an aid to assimilation,
the General Allotment Act of 1887 resulted in surrendering
traditional communal ownership of land. 191 And, as a final
example, Indians have been punished for engaging in traditional
ceremonies and other expressions of adherence to their tradi-
tional beliefs, and their medicine bundles have been forcibly
burned. 92
186. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959).
187. See generally F. Pxucir, AmsmicAN INDIAN PoLicY CRisis (1976).
188. Remarks of President Andrew Jackson, 3 Comsp.AnioN oF THE MESSAGES &
PAPERS OF Tim PRESmIENTs 519 (J. D. Richardson ed.) (1904).
189. See, e.g., Treaty with the-Chippewa of Saginaw, Swan Creek, and Black River,
1864, Oct. 18, 1864, United States-Chippewa, art. 4, in 2 KAPPLER, LAWS AND TREATiES
868, 872 (1904).
190. See generally C. E. ScHArm, AN ACCULTURATION STUDY oF Tim INDIANs OF
THE FLAmEAD RESEVATION IN WESrERN MONTANA, 1934-35 (1935).
191. 24 Stat. 388, 25 U.S.C. § 33L (1887).
192. T. MoRGAN, REP RT oF nrm CoMMISSIONER OF INDIuN AFFAms 29 (1892).
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While the judiciary has not been quite as malign toward
Indian cultures and beliefs, neither has it been entirely benign.
For example, it was said in United States v. Sandoval,'9 "Until
the old customs and Indian practices are broken among this
people we cannot hope for a great amount of progress.... The
time must come when the Pueblos must give up these old pagan
customs and become citizens in fact."' 1 4 Here it can be seen
that a vintage Court was not about to protect, or even tolerate,
Indian beliefs.
In contrast to those earlier periods, later pronouncements on
Indian beliefs have been more accepting. As Cohen commented,
"Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh
air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment
of Indians ... reflects the rise and fall in our democratic
faith."' 95 In an act which reaffirmed the nation's faith in de-
mocracy, Congress in 1978 passed the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act (AIRFA).'9 While the AIRFA may not be directly
implicated in the Indian portrait cases, the intent of Congress
expressed therein ought to be influential. The AIRFA expresses
congressional acknowledgement that official and unofficial pol-
icies, by showing no tolerance for traditional Indian beliefs,
have almost always done immeasurable harm to Indian peoples.
Through the AIRFA, Congress has acknowledged further that
it is obliged to extend its protection over Indian beliefs. By
engaging in vituperative commentary against traditional Indian
beliefs, current courts are eluding the will of the American
people as expressed by Congress.
The Right to Privacy and the American Indian Portrait Cases
This section applies the law of privacy to the American Indian
portrait cases under discussion. To analyze the legalities of these
cases, Prosser's complex of four torts will be used.' 97 This is
not to show that Prosser's complex is so extraordinarily useful,
but to show that even analyzing these cases under Prosser's
framework, as the involved courts did, the courts in the Indian
portrait cases committed plain error.
193. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
194. Id. at 42.
195. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy,
62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
196. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 130-70.
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One curious facet of the Indian portrait cases is that none of
them were able to reach the jury. The adverse outcomes were
all the result of the courts having found that plaintiffs were
members of groups of people who are, as a matter of law, not
reasonably sensible in their beliefs about the uses to which their
portraits could be used. It was stated by these courts that the
plaintiffs had no causes of action because their injuries resulted
from their super-sensitivities and not from some real harm. This
section is an attempt to determine if the courts' position is
correct. Discussion of the role of reasonable sensibilities, in
these cases, will be delayed until the end.
It seems clear that the likeness of each of the plaintiffs in
these cases was wrongfully appropriated for the good of the
defendants. At least the first element is obvious, i.e., the plain-
tiffs were all readily identifiable by their photographs. The next
question is whether the use was incidental or was the result of
a deliberate attempt to capture the value of the likeness. It is
not at all clear how the use could be incidental. Incidental to
what? The plaintiffs were alone, not in crowds where people
may be fungible. Some of the plaintiffs may have been in the
open, but so were Zacchini and Raible. In any event, can a
person stand in the open without fear that photographers are
all about, ready to snap one's picture, later to sell it and make
a fortune, all without permission or even compensation? Prosser,
Zacchini, and Raible say one can. After all, in what sort of
goldfish bowl-nation do we make our homes? In what sort of
a self-serving society do we make our friends?
Moreover, the plaintiffs were not notorious personages, nor
did they accidentally put themselves in localities of notorious
events. Rather, the photographers sought out and took pictures
of those plaintiffs as individuals. Other individuals were avail-
able and could have been sought, but they were not selected.
Deliberation then is clear, but what of value? Did the plaintiffs'
likenesses have any value to be appropriated? If those likenesses
did not, how did the photographers sell them? Since the plain-
tiffs' likenesses did have value, Zacchini makes it clear that the
appropriation was not necessarily protected. As for the other
defendants-the news agencies and nonprofit corporations-
Judge Sutin's rule seems appropriate. 198 The nonprofit defen-
dants were dealing in portraits for profit. The news agencies
were doing the same. The plaintiffs were not newsworthy except
to the extent that the news agencies made them so. That is,
198. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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plaintiffs were private persons dragged before the public eye,
but the defendant news agencies had no right to treat private
human beings in that manner.
Nor would holding these cases to be invasions of privacy by
appropriation of one's likeness place unreasonable constraints
on the photographers' free speech. It cannot be contended that
they merely ran over to the reservation to take a few snapshots.
They went to a great deal of trouble to find just the right
subjects. They went to a great deal of trouble to prepare the
portraits. And they went to a great deal of trouble to market
their work. A couple of the photographers even went to the
trouble of asking the plaintiffs to sit for their portraits, but
they did not go to the trouble of telling their subjects what was
to be done with the photos. How much more trouble would it
have been to obtain permission to publish those pictures? Fur-
thermore, while they were going to all that trouble, what pre-
vented the photographers from asking permission to publish?
Did they not ask because they feared refusal? If that is so, the
defendants acted with actual malice. In any event, by exceeding
the limits of the granted permission, the photographers violated
the plaintiffs' privacy.' 99
In addition, Cantrell indicates that the photographers' em-
ployers, if any, could have been held responsible for the pho-
tographers' behavior. By similar reasoning, Barber v. Time,
Inc.2 held that their transferees should be liable also. While
Dodd v. Pearson20 may appear to argue a contrary result, Dodd
involved a public person and we have seen that the private-
public distinction is available in privacy violations.
It seems equally clear that in these Indian portrait cases, the
plaintiffs were subjected to unreasonable intrusions. Prosser
indicated that intrusion cases should turn on the manner and
purpose of the invasion.202 The manner of the invasion was
irregular in that it consisted of withholding from the plaintiffs
the uses to which their portraits were to be put. Moreover, the
purpose was to make money and not to report news. As was
the case in appropriation, the news agencies and nonprofit
corporations should be held liable for the acts of their agents.
Against the claim of objectionable publicity to private con-
cerns, it was argued that the portraits were not highly objec-
199. See supra text accompanying note 139.
200. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
201. 279 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 410 F.2d 701
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
202. W. PROSSER & W. KEaroN, supra note 92, at 856.
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tionable. This defense misses the point. It is not the private
events which are highly objectionable, but the publicity given to
them. Most people do not find the private activities in their
own bedrooms to be highly offensive, but if those activities were
to be let out to the world, most people would likely be resentful.
Similarly, the plaintiffs in these cases did not allege that their
own faces were highly objectionable. They argued that all rea-
sonable persons would have found highly objectionable the pub-
lication of their own portraits had they been photographed with
the understanding that their portraits would not be publicized.
It was the violation of human trust and confidence, involved in
the publications, which the plaintiffs found to be highly objec-
tionable. Moreover, because the plaintiffs were private persons,
and their likenesses were not on public records, there would be
no constitutional protection open to the defendants.
The false light invasion of privacy might not be so easy to
comprehend for these cases, except Benally, of course. Never-
theless, all of these plaintiffs were cast in a false light before
the public. The plaintiffs are members of groups of people who
believe that it is dangerous to allow one's likeness to be scattered
across the face of the earth. Insofar as only fools and lunatics
engage in what they themselves perceive to be pointlessly dan-
gerous behavior, pro tanto plaintiffs were falsely cast in the
light of being fools and lunatics before the other Indian members
of their communities. There was no compelling reason for the
defendants to subject the plaintiffs to the ridicule and scorn of
their communities. Nor can the defendants beg off as having
had no intent to harm the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were private
persons; actual malice is unnecessary to recover in this tort.
Only negligence is necessary.
So we see that far from the courts' contentions that these
Indian plaintiffs had no causes of action, each plaintiff in fact
had four causes against each defendant. In addition, resolving
these causes of action turned on issues of fact. Therefore, all
of these cases. should have reached the juries. Examination of
the opinions will show these cases were disallowed from going
to the juries not because there were no causes of action, but
solely because the judges were convinced that the charges were
based on traditional Indian beliefs. That is to say, the justices
misunderstood what they had been presented. They had been
presented with real invasions of privacy which, coincidentally,
involved traditional Indians. The beliefs of these plaintiffs had
nothing to do with whether their privacy had been invaded. The
beliefs had only to do with the question of damages. All of the
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plaintiffs made similar arguments to the justices, but they argued
to stone walls. The justices were so unreasonable apparently
because of their convictions that the plaintiffs' beliefs demon-
strated a lack of reasonable sensibilities.
A defense of the plaintiffs against such an absurd vitriol will
not be undertaken, except to say this: Beliefs are unsubstantiated
assumptions about the world. If they were substantiated, they
would no longer be beliefs. From this perspective it appears that
all beliefs, by their very nature, are unreasonable, be they Anglo-
American beliefs or American Indian beliefs. Beliefs, therefore,
are never more or less reasonable, only more or less acceptable,
depending on the society in which they arise. America is a highly
pluralistic society with room for any number of divergent beliefs,
so long as they do not contravene the law. The beliefs involved
in the Indian portrait cases did not contravene the law, i.e., the
beliefs were not the origin of the claim of the invasion of
privacy. The law has no new principle to formulate, conse-
quently, when it extends the protection of privacy to the Indians.
The courts in these cases were correct when they said that it
is to national and state norms that the protections of privacy
extend. They were incorrect when they implied that Indians do
not count. In what country do American Indians live? In what
states do the Penobscot Indians of Maine, and the Navajo
Indians of New Mexico reside? Indians are part of American
society. The courts must recognize this fact and they must
protect the rights of American Indians. Furthermore, the courts
must cease from officially deriding American Indian cultural
and traditional beliefs. The people of the United States of
America have expressed their dissatisfaction with such derision
and the courts must respect this attitude. 23
Conclusions on Privacy and the
American Indian Portrait Cases
We have seen ample social science evidence that the need for
privacy is basic to Anglo-Americans and American Indians alike.
We have seen that there is ample moral reason to protect
Indians' rights to privacy, as well as ample legal doctrine to do
so. What must still be questioned, on the other hand, is how
the plaintiffs lost their portrait privacy cases.
Prosser argued that success in privacy cases often turns on
whether the unwanted exposure is of matters which offend public
203. See supra text accompanying note 196.
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mores.2" A perusal of the cases shows that Prosser was correct.
That is, instead of protecting people from unwarranted and
unreasonable invasions of their privacy, as Warren and Brandeis
had advocated, the courts have frequently engaged in censoring
stories which they have found to be offensive to public sensi-
bilities. Privacy, however, is protection of individual sensibilities;
protection of public sensibilities should be brought under charges
of obscenity, pornography, and the like. The question in a
privacy case is not whether a subject matter will entertain or
offend the public. The question is whether someone's privacy
has been invaded in a manner which, if it had happened to
them, would have offended the general public. In many in-
stances, that inquiry should encompass the subject matter pub-
licized, but just as frequently, it should encompass the manner
in which the plaintiff's privacy has been invaded.
The Indian privacy cases, Bitsie, Nelson, and Benally, were
lost by the plaintiffs essentially on two findings: the pictures
were flattering portraits of handsome people, and Indians were
found not to be reasonably sensible. The first finding is irrele-
vant, the second absurd. Even if the findings in the Indian
privacy cases weren't irrelevant and absurd, beautiful neurotics
nonetheless have their rights. The plaintiffs were not beautiful
neurotics, however, and they were not being unreasonable. They
were merely attempting to protect their basic human needs, and
thus their basic human rights to privacy.
The last point underscores the insidious nature of privacy
violations. That is, if one's privacy is invaded and one attempts
to assert a legal remedy, one has lost more of one's privacy.
While it is certain that free speech and free press must remain
free, these rights must not be allowed to annihilate privacy,
thereby destroying the lives of people whose only recourse is to
take it on the chin or further subject themselves to public
scrutiny. To prevent this evil, it will be necessary for the law
to protect privacy qua privacy and not merely to protect relevant
economic interests.
Finally, it is clear that if the Anglo-American judiciary will
not protect Indians' rights to privacy, the tribal judiciary will
need to take up the task. Even if the Anglo-American courts
do decide to protect privacy, however, the American Indian
tribal courts should also-just to be sure.
204. IV. PROSSER & W. K-obr, supra note 92, at § 117.
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